The European Convention on Human Rights, for the most part, guarantees civil and political rights. It is a unique international instrument that provides what is widely regarded as the most effective trans-national judicial process for complaints brought by citizens and organizations against their respective governments.
The aim of this article is to contribute to the continuing debate on the notion of democracy according to the European Convention on Human Rights. Not only has the Convention been a standard-setter in Europe, but it is also a source of inspiration in promotion of democracy and democratic values for other regions of the world. With this in mind, the article considers the appropriate elements of the Convention which directly concerns democratic values. To that end, the article critically examines the relevant Articles of the Convention on the notion of democracy as well as on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, in recent decades, the Convention has ma de a telling contribution in relatıon to transition to peace and democracy in the former communist Eastern European states.
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and democracy throughout Europe. 4 It is worth noting that the Council of Europe is no longer limited to the Western European states. 5 Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, geographic and cultural influence of the Convention has progressed eastward and now encompasses all of the former Soviet Eastern Bloc states. 6 In fact, at present, forty-seven countries representing 800 million citizens have now recognized the right of their citizens to bring cases against them at the European Court of Human Rights (Court). 7 The Convention is also becoming increasingly a source of legal inspiration in other legal jurisdictions. The Convention was created as a standard-setter and upholder of liberal democracy in Europe, and ever since the issue of democracy has been one of its inseparable fundamental features. The 'Travaux Preparatoires' of the Convention unequivocally states that it was created to "prevent rebirth of totalitarianism", to "defend our people from dictatorship", and to "strengthen the resistance in all our countries against insidious attempts to undermine our way of life". 10 The Convention goes on to impress upon the citizens of member countries of the Council of Europe that it would "define and guarantee the political basis of this association of European nations" and "ensure that member states of the Council of Europe are democratic and remain democratic" while providing a "code of law for the democracies."
11
The European Convention on Human Rights was a direct product of the immediate post-war era to unify Europe. 12 The Convention was a reaction to the serious human rights abuses that Europe had witnessed in the course of the Second World War. 13 But "it can also be viewed in the context of the much longer struggle to secure respect for personal autonomy, the inherent dignity of persons, and equality of all men and women." 14 The preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) asserts that European countries have a common heritage of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, which are the principles of liberal democracy and the underlying Hence, it is fair to say that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society. 16 Moreover, the Convention was to achieve all this by providing a collective guarantee, if not of all applicable rights and freedoms, then at least of those considered "essential for a democratic way of life."
17
Since its creation, the European Court of Human Rights (Court) has had to preside over many cases in which the question of democracy and its concept within the framework of the Convention as well as the rights of anti-democratic actors in a liberal democracy have been dealt with.
18
This article will deal with relevant articles of the Convention, which encapsulate the concept of democracy through the case-law of the Court and how its jurisprudence has evolved in this regard since the 1950s. In doing so, this article will look into the Courts conception of democracy in such areas as the essential requirements of any political system based on liberal democracy.
II. The Notion of Democracy and the Convention
The drafters of the Convention devoted a prominent role to promotion of pluralism and democracy in Western European states by incorporating the idea of democracy as a cornerstone to protect the right of the individual.
19
The notion of a 'democratic society' permeates the entire European Convention system. In the preamble to the 1949 statute of the Council of Europe, the participating states reaffirm "their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual 15 The Strasbourg organs have emphasized the point that "democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always prevail" but, "a balance must be achieved which ensures fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoid abuse of a dominant position." 21 In recent decades, the Court has turned its attention to the fundamental link between the substantive rights guaranteed by the Convention and the concept and existence of democracy within the member states. 22 There is no doubt that the Court considers qualities such as pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness, equality, liberty and encouraging self-fulfilment as important characteristics of any functioning democracy. 23 On the question of the relationship between democracy and the Convention the Grand Chamber in its unanimous decision in the case of the United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey held:
That is apparent, firstly, from the preamble to the Convention, which establishes a very clear connection between the Convention and democracy by stating that the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms are best ensured on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of human rights. 24 Moreover, in its Grand Chamber decision in Gorzelik and others v Poland the ECtHR defined pluralism as 'the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and dynamics of cultural conditions, ethnic and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socioeconomic ideas and concepts.'
25

III. Democratic Rights and the Convention
The centrality of democracy to the Convention system does not mean that the precise form of democracy ımplied by the convention particularly clear. 26 Nonetheless, the Court has consistently maintained that at the heart of the notion of democracy is based on the full participation of all the citizens of the high contracting parties. 27 Participatory democracy includes 'the formal conception of majority rule which concerns the method of decision-making and, over and above this requirement, also demand that the majority respect the equal worth of all citizens. 28 Therefore, democracy is the only political model that the Convention aims for and finds compatible with it.
29
In a democracy, however, it is assumed that limitations on individual rights and freedoms for the common good or to protect more compelling rights of others would be justified.
30
As a democracy is based on the equal worth of individuals, at least certain human rights must be protected. In particular, political rights, such freedom of expression, the right to vote, and the freedom of assembly are understood as vital for a functioning democracy. Democracy must also be understood to require the protection of other human rights, such as the right to family life and correspondence and the right to religion. Therefore, according to the Court Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention encapsulate the concept of democracy have common features which may require interference with the use of the rights set out by these articles. If a restriction on democracy is prescribed by law, the Court then would consider whether the law, or rather the way in which it was applied, is "necessary in a democratic society" for any of the reasons outlined in the Articles. 34 Hence, the Court has developed the approach that states have a "margin of appreciation" in deciding whether a particular restriction on a right is required in the given circumstance. 35 In the case of Handyside the Court stated: By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirement as well as on the 'necessity' of a 'restriction' or 'penalty' to meet them.
36
The Court also goes on to say: Whilst the adjective 'necessary' . . .is not synonymous with "indispensable", neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as "admissible", "ordinary", "useful", "reasonable" or "desirable". Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion of "necessary in this context. been noted that, "in relation to the Convention proper, the Court's conception of democracy is only elucidated incidentally-through consideration of the democratic rights contained in the convention."
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IV. The Notion of Democracy and
39
The substantive rights that are considered to comprise the concept of democracy are easily identified.
40
Express reference to the concept of democracy may be seen in the second paragraphs of Articles 8-11 of the Convention as well as Articles 2(3) and (4) of the Fourth Protocol. 41 Each of the Articles 8-11 set out a Convention right in the first paragraph, and set out possible qualifications to the right in their second paragraph as a means of right-restrictive measures. 42 In spite of some "differences of detail in the nature of the limitations arising under each article, there is sufficient commonality of approach to justify a collective consideration of these limitations before examining the substantive rights protected under each of these articles." 43 The Court has explicated that "there is undoubtedly a link between all of these provisions, namely the need to guarantee respect for pluralism of opinion in a democratic society through the exercise of civic and political freedom." 44 Initially, in regards to the concept of democracy, the Court considered Articles 10 protecting "Freedom of Expression" and Article 11 "freedom of Assembly and association" as the more relevant articles to the concept of democracy and democratic process. 45 This transpires in four ways, "through judgements on Articles 10 and 11, which guarantee freedom of expression and association respectively, on merits of applications and through Article 17 in decisions on admissibility, also relevant is the rather 39 Article 17 of the Convention sets out prohibition from the use of Convention rights from implying: "Any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention." 47 Therefore, Article 17 prevents member states from abusing the Convention rights, curtailing the rights and freedoms of others, in other words, providing a safety mechanism specifically designed to prohibit totalitarian movements from using human rights as a means of furthering their cause. 48 Nonetheless, it has been noticed elsewhere that freedom of expression under Article 10 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which provides the guarantee of free elections held at reasonable intervals are the two provisions of the Convention, "embodied the characteristics of a democratic society." 49 The Court has stressed that "eminence of freedom of expression in a democratic society of which it is one of the essential foundations and one of the most basic conditions for its progress and of each individual's self-fulfilment."
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In recent decades, Article 8 which protects "private and family life, home and correspondence," and Article 9 which protects "freedom of religion and belief," have also been considered by the Court in relation to the general concept of democracy. 
IV.A. Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
Article 8 of the Convention protects four connected rights.
52
Those include the right to private and family life and the right to respect for home and correspondence.
53
Each one of these rights is "autonomous" and the Court is not constrained by any national interpretation of them.
54
The Court consistently has refrained from providing a comprehensive definition of private life. 55 Article 12 of the Convention complements Article 8, guaranteeing the right to marry and find a family.
56
In addition, the member states of the Council of Europe have decided to reinforce the equality of spouses in family life by adopting Article 5 of the Seventh Protocol.
57
Article 8 places on states the obligation to respect a wide range of personal interest.
58
Article 8 secures not only negative but also positive aspects of the rights in question.
59
The Court has spelt out the dual nature of Article 8 rights: "Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it may involve the authorities' On one hand, the state in question is obliged not to interfere with the domain of private and family life, home, or correspondence. On the other, the state is required to take particular necessary measures to realize the effective enjoyment of these rights.
IV.B Article 8 and Personal Correspondence
When the Court finds a particular measure to be in "interference" with the rights embodied under the first paragraph of Article 8, it must consider whether such interference may be justified by the conditions laid down in the second paragraph. 61 The standard formula developed in the case law is common to other personal freedoms set out in Articles 9 -11. A violation of Article 8 can only be justified providing it is "in accordance with the law," has a "legitimate aim," and is "necessary in a democratic society." 
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Therefore, in order to curb member state's discretionary powers, the Strasbourg organs have required that the law in question must be accessible and foreseeable. 65 In particular, the "foreseeability test" provides a crucial safeguard for the citizen by requiring the law to be "sufficiently clear" and precise and by giving "adequate indication" as to the circumstances in which and conditions on which any secret surveillance or interceptive measures are employed. 66 Another implication of the foreseeability test is the requirement that adequate safeguard against possible abuses must be provided clearly demonstrating the extent of the authorities' discretion and defining the circumstances in which it is to be exercised. 67 In other areas of complaints under Article 8, by contrast, the first standard has rarely been contested, and the Convention bodies have focused their examination on the third standard; "necessary in a democratic society." 68 The best example of this judicial oversight by the court was when it presided over a series of cases involving British citizens alleging illegal interception of their correspondence. 69 The Court held that due to the fact that there was no domestic law to regulate such activities there had been a breach of Article 8 by the United Kingdom. 70 These rulings prompted the British government to fill this lacuna by enacting the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 71 As a consequence of this Act, the telephone tapping civil cases in the United Kingdom are now brought under Article 8 of the Convention as in the most recent case, brought by a number of British politicians and celebrities against the Metropolitan Police. 72 They successfully argued that there was a breach of Article 8 since the police had failed to inform them about the telephone hacking and 208 had failed in their duty to carry out a thorough investigation as part of its positive duty under Article 8. 73 Moreover, it is worth noting that the doctrine of margin of appreciation plays a pivotal role in the development of Article 8 case law providing states a certain degree of discretion particularly in certain areas where the court is reluctant to impede the decisions made by states in relation to issues "where a different approach is justified by local conditions." Hence, the Court has reiterated that Article 9 is not simply "one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believer," but also "a precious asset for atheists, sceptics, and the unconcerned." For the Article to apply, a belief must "attain a certain a level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance," and more importantly, by the possible qualifications in Article 9(2).
82
This allows the state to interfere with the right if the three tests in Article 9(2) are met.
83
The interference must be "prescribed by law," have one of the legitimate aims listed in Article 9(2) and be "necessary in a democratic society." 84 Despite the importance and the extent of interests protected by Article 9, some observers have argued that due to the cautious approach adopted by the Court and the Commission in the early days of the Convention, traditionally, relatively few applications were made alleging violations of Article 9; only a small proportion of those have given rise to successful claims.
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The case-law related to this right is very recent, with the first judgment finding a violation of this article only delivered in the much referred to Kokkinakis case in 1993. 86 However, since then a rich and often controversial jurisprudence has begun to develop, including two judgments on Turkish attempts to ban the wearing of Muslim headscarves in certain higher education establishments; the fallout Switzerland's attempt to ban the construction of new minarets will also give rise to some thought-provoking legal arguments.
88
IV.D Democracy as a limit on restricting freedom of religion Justifying a restriction on religion or belief, and the extent to which it is "necessary in a democratic society," has often been a controversial issue.
89
In line with other international human rights instruments on religious liberty, Article 9 enshrines the rights in the first paragraph, and provides for the possible qualifications to the right in the second paragraph. The qualifications of Article 9 are slightly different to the other personal freedoms since they pertain only the manifestation of religion or belief (the forum externum), rather than the act or state of believing itself (the forum internum). Interpreting the scope of Article 9 (1) has been rather challenging, and the European Commission's decision in Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, that not all actions motivated by religious belief fall within it, has been met with some criticism.
90
In applying the limitations contained in Article 9 (2), the Court has been rather sensitive to varied constitutional traditions of the member states, notwithstanding the fact that this approach has been criticized by certain scholars. 91 The main characteristic of Article 9 in relation to this study is the extent to which the Court has recognised a strong link between religion and a democratic society. According to the Court, "freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention."
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In this manner, Article 9 needs to be interpreted in light of other Convention rights, such as the Article 11, the right of assembly and association. 93 Consequently, interference with the rights stipulated in Article 9 may be examined not only as an 88 infringement on the applicant's own religion or beliefs, but also as an indirect violation on the democratic fabric of society. 94 Restrictions on Article 9 must comply with the conditions specified in Article 9 (2). They must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 95 These specific "interests" are more commonly referred to in the European jurisprudence as "legitimate aims."
96
It is also important to note that other major international human rights instruments adopt the same approach to the issue of religious belief by striking a balance between the "legitimacy" of restrictions and their "necessity" to limiting freedom of religion.
97
IV.E Article 10: Freedom of Expression
Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression, which has been described as "one of the cardinal rights guaranteed under the Convention." opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licencing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprise. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. expression, freedom of information, freedom of communication via mass media, and specific parts of the freedom of artistic and academic expression. 99 Indeed, the marked importance of this right and the demand for its special protection due to its close linkage to democracy's political process is an indispensable part of the Convention. 100 The Court has consistently maintained that states are under obligation to ensure that private individuals can effectively exercise their right of communication between themselves. 101 Furthermore, freedom of political debate is at the very core of the concept of democratic society, which prevails throughout the convention. 102 The Court has repeatedly reiterated that "freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual's self-fulfilment." 103 The convention has underlined the need for transparency and accountability on the part of the high contracting states. 104 In ascertaining whether a positive obligation to act exists in a particular situation, certain"regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and interests of individuals." 105 The most protected class of expression has been political expression, since the Court considers such expression as an essential part of any effective pluralist democracy, in order to ensure respect for fundamental human rights. 106 The court has emphasised this point forcefully that "in a democratic system, the acts or omissions of the government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only the legislative and judicial authorities but also the press and public opinopinion." 107 This point was reiterated in the United Communist Party of Turkey case, in which the court considered pluralism at the heart of its conception of democracy. 108 Hence, the court firmly puts the onus on the member states as the "ultimate guarantors of the principle of pluralism", especially in the context of media.
109
As the Court famously held in Handyside v. United Kingdom, even opinions which "shock, offend, or disturb" should be tolerated.
110
In line with this the Court in the case of Vajnai v. Hungary has reiterated that:
A Legal system which applies restrictions on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of public feelings -real or imaginarycannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social needs recognised in democratic society, since the society must remain reasonable in its judgment. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and opinion is subjected to the heckler's veto.
111
In the recent case of Cumhuriyet Vakfi and Others v. Turkey, the Court reiterated the importance of freedom of expression as "one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual self-fulfilment".
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IV.E(i) Freedom of Expression and Transition to Democracy
In recent decades, both the Court and the Commission have acknowledged that in a transition to democracy it may be legitimate to curtail forms of speech which are very critical of the state. 
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In a situation where politically motivated violence poses a conconstant threat to the lives and security of the population, it is particularly difficult to strike a balance between the requirements of protecting freedom of expression and the imperatives of protecting the democratic state.
114
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and accession of all of the former Soviet Bloc states in Europe to the Council of Europe, the Court has been faced with an entirely different challenge of transitional democracies in those states. 115 Nevertheless, the Convention "to which most central and Eastern European countries acceded in the years immediately following the demise of communist regimes, was a crucial signpost on the road to democracy and the rule of law."
116
It is worth noting that such challenges were not limited to the former Soviet Bloc states and the Court had previously faced similar tasks in the case of Southern European states. 117 Although, the process of transition does not prompt the Court to deviate from its established jurisprudence but the Court's judgments on the freedom of expression are of particular salience to transitional process. 118 Therefore, the Court's case-law has strongly adopted an approach in which information exchange and pluralities of opinions is of paramount importance in any democratic society, therefore, restoring a balance between the citizens' fundamental rights and the state-a balance completely void in the era of authoritarian rule in the former communist states of Eastern Europe. 
IV.F Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association provides protection for the formation of collective entities by individuals for any lawful purpose. 120 Thus, political parties play a special role within the guarantee of freedom of association due to their pivotal role in the functioning of a democratic government.
121
The Grand Chamber has referred to 'the primordial role played in a democratic regime by political parties enjoying the freedoms and rights enshrined in Article 11 and also in Article 10 of the Convention.' 122 Not only citizens in fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe but also some nationals of the more established democracies in Europe have had to rely on the Court's jurisprudence in relation to the rights to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 of Convention) and the obligation upon states to hold free elections (Article 3, of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention).
123
Article 11 protects the two distinct if sometimes connected freedoms of peaceful assembly and association. cit., p.516.
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justify interference with these rights in order to foster democratic values, in turn leading to allegations of excessive rights limitations 125 In recent years, the Court has had to deal with the more practical application of the notion of democracy in regards to freedom of assembly and association. 126 The eligibility to stand for election to a national parliament was examined in the case of Zdanoka v Latvia, which concerned refusal by the Latvian authorities to allow the applicant, Mrs. Tatjana Zdanoko, 127 a member of the Communist Party of Latvia to be included on the resident's register to stand for the first parliamentary elections in 1993-since Latvia's regaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 128 The Chamber and Grand Chamber in this case adopted entirely different approaches to the interpretation of someone's eligibility to stand for election. On the one hand, in its Chamber judgment, the Court held that the electoral restrictions by the Latvian government in 1995 had violated Mrs Zdanoka's P 1-3 right. The Chamber felt compelled to "adhere to the same criteria" permitted by Articles 8-11, since "the only type of necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of those rights is, therefore, one which may claim to emanate from democratic society." 129 However, the Grand Chamber held that:
Where an interference with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is in issue the Court should not automatically adhere to the same criteria as those applied with regard to the interference permitted by the second paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention . . . Because of the relevance of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the institutional order of the State, this provision is cast in very different terms from Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention . . . The standards to be applied for 217 establishing compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 must theretherefore be considered to be less stringent than those applied under Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. 130 Hence, the implied defense to "the institutional order of the state' echoes specific reference to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. 131 By adopting this approach the Grand Chamber established a high supervisory threshold in which case a violation would only take place if procedural deficiencies gave rise to likely arbitrary treatment. 132 It is clear that the Grand Chamber was of the opinion that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 does not exclude the restrictions on electoral rights, since it may be imposed on "an individual who has, for example seriously abused a public position or whose conduct threatens to undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations". 133 This approach is very much in step with Allen's observation that "there is reluctance to allow the Court to be used as a forum for hearing disputes that have their origin in the pre-transitional era" since "there is a strong, though not universal, belief within the European Court that there is little to be gained by investigating the stories of victim." 134 In other words, in such cases, the contracting states are given considerable latitude to establish their constitutional rules regarding the status of parliamentarians which inevitably would include the criteria for disqualification. 135 This would include ensuring the independence of members of parliament as well as electorate's freedom of choice.
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The wide margin of appreciation given to states is mainly because each state has historical and political factors unique to them and the criteria would vary accordingly. 137 Nonetheless, according to Hamilton: One apparent consequence of the more relaxed scrutiny of Article 3 of Protocol 1 is that no assessment need be made of extant transitional risk. This again sharpens the contrast with Articles 10 and 218 11 of Convention which demand attention to the imminence of an evevidenced threat. 138 However, the Court was unanimous in its decision that there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 by Latvia. 139 Indeed, this judgement indicates the court's concern regarding fairness of free elections as well as enabling states to place limitations on the senior holders of public office to gain electoral advantage whilst still connected with the prestige and powers of such offices. 140 However, in an apparent U-turn, the Court has found violations of Article 3 of Protocol 1 in the cases of Adamsons v. Latvia with similar background. 141 Some scholars have observed that the above two cases indicate a narrowing of the gap between Article 11 and Article 3 of Protocol 1 scrutiny. 142 In Adamsons, the Latvian government had disqualified a former low-ranking officer of the KGB border guard from standing the 2002 general election. 143 In a departure from the previous approach, not only did the Court consider the affiliation of this person's involvement with the previous regime but crucially considered his activities in the society since the collapse of the Soviet Union which according to the Court:
The Court considered, in the light of the particular sociohistorical background to the applicant's case that during the first years after Latvia had regained independence, electoral rights could be substantially restricted without thereby infringing Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. However, with the passing of time, a more general suspicion regarding a group of persons no longer sufficed and the authorities had to provide further arguments and evidence to justify the measure in question. 144 This approach has since been reiterated by the Court in the case of and Tanase v Moldova in which the Court held that prevention of a Moldovan citizen holding dual nationality from standing in for election "some seventeen years after Moldova had gained independence and five years after it had relaxed its laws to allow dual-citizenship" was illegal.
145
IV.G The Convention Rights and Political parties
As noted above, political parties are the very cornerstones of European democracy and the Court considers pluralism as an inseparable part of liberal democracy. In order to maintain political debate political parties are the other crucial participants of a pluralistic system of government. The court has opined that:
Such expression is inconceivable without the participation of a plurality of political parties representing the different shades of opinion to be found within a country's population. By relaying this range of opinion, not only within political institutions but also with the help of media at all levels of social life, political parties make an irreplaceable contribution to political debate, which is at the very core of a democratic society. 146 In the case of Socialist Party of Turkey v Turkey, the Court emphasised on the importance of pluralism in a democratic society to the extent that challenging existing national structure was acceptable only through democratic means that "it is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question the way a state is currently organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself." 147 Hence, constitutional reform even of fundamental nature is a justifiable topic of political debate as long as the advocates are not seeking to undermine the very foundation of the national democratic system.
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In the early 1990s, one of the challenges for the Court's jurisprudence was presented with a series of cases involving closure 220 of nine political parties in Turkey. 149 In the first eight cases the Court's approach was very similar in its reasoning. The reason for dissolution of these political parties was that they were all striving to settle the Kurdish problem democratically and advocating a federal state comprised of a Kurdish and a Turkish nation. The Court was of the opinion that it could not justify a ban and while the states could take measures to protect their institutions, a political party could not be excluded from the protection of the Convention simply because the activities of these political parties are regarded by the national authorities as undermining the constitutional structure of the state. 150 In the case of the United Communist party of Turkey and Others, the Court held that the mere inclusion of the word "Communist" in the name of the party could not justify dissolution of that party. 151 Nonetheless, in contrast to the case of the German Communist party, this party posed no threat to Turkish society, as it did not pursue traditional communist aims. 152 The Court was unanimous in their conclusion regarding the aforementioned parties that since they bore no responsibility for Kurdish terrorism, the dissolution violated Article 11. 153 However, in contrast to these cases, the seminal exception was the Court's now notorious decision in the case of Refah Partisi v Turkey, in which the court upheld the decision of the Turkish Supreme Court to ban an Islamist party.
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The coming to prominence by the Refah Partisi in Turkey, very much reflected the rise of an 'Islamic resurgence' at the end of the twentieth century. 155 In spite of its secular political system Turkey a predominantly Muslim state was not different from other Islamic countries experiencing this sea change.
156
The Court unanimously ruled that there was no violation of article 11, a decision vehemently criticised by some prominent scholars such as McGoldrick. 157 This was mainly based on the fact that the leaders of Refah had made public speeches advocating imposition of Sharia law, which was considered irreconcilable with the notion of liberal democracy, as conceived by the Convention.
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As Harvey puts it, "given that the party had over four million members this amounts to the largest single interference with freedom of association in European jurisprudence". Although PCN openly purported to be a MarxistLeninist organization, but very much distanced itself from the former Romanian Communist Party that had ruled Romania during the Cold War period. The Bucharest County Court held that PCN's political programme aimed at "establishing a humane state based on communist doctrine, which would imply that the constitutional and 156. Refah Partisi was established in 1983, and soon experienced success in local and general elections. In the Turkish general election in December 1995, Refah Partisi obtained 22 per cent of the vote and was the biggest in the Grand National assembly. On 28 June 1996, it came to power as the senior partner in a coalition government and in January 1997, an opinion poll suggested that it was likely to win 67 per cent of the votes in the following general election to be held four years later. The Court in Strasbourg rejected the Romanian government's argument that it could not permit "the emergence of a new communist party to form the subject of democratic debate", and reiterated the importance of pluralism and political parties which applied to all of the signatories to the Convention. 162 The Court stated that "political parties played an essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy" as well as "there can be no democracy without pluralism" 163 Moreover, the Court held that:
The Court is also prepared to take into account the historical background to cases before it, in this instance Romania's experience of totalitarian communism prior to 1989. However, it observes that that context cannot by itself justify the need for the interference, especially as communist parties adhering to Marxist ideology exist in a number of countries that are signatories to the Convention. 164 The approach of the Court in the above case could be construed as quite a departure from previous case-law regarding former Communist Eastern European states. However, it should be pointed out that PCN had made it absolutely clear that it accepted pluralism, multiparty political system and had no affiliation with the former Romanian Communist Party 165 On the part of the Court, in the words of Hamilton "the Court has demonstrated its resolve to foster a robust and inclusive political sphere, underpinned by the values of pluralism and social cohesion". 166 In this regard, the judgment of Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain is of significance, in which the Court held:
[I]t necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite to violence or put forward a policy which fails to respect democracy 161 or which is aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay claim to the Convention's protection against penalties imposed on those grounds . . . . 167 Moreover, the Court attached a caveat to the above passage by noting that:
[A] State may "reasonably forestall the execution of such a policy, which is incompatible with the Convention's provisions, before an attempt is made to implement it through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the country's democratic regime. 168 In the recent case of Vona v. Hungary, the Court was of the opinion that the dissolution of the Hungarian Guard Association (Magyar Garda) by domestic court was lawful restriction of the applicant's rights under Article 11 of the Convention. 169 The said organization had openly advocated a racist message against the Romani population of Hungary. In the Court's view:
[T]he State is entitled to take preventive measures to protect democracy vis-à-vis such non-party entities as well, if a sufficiently imminent prejudice to the rights of others undermines the fundamental values upon which a democratic society rests and functions. One of such values is the cohabitation of members of society without racial segregation, without which a democratic society is inconceivable. 170 The Court found that the Hungarian authorities were entitled to take preventive measures in order to protect democracy and proscribe the organization due to its racist and divisive views.
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It is the established case-law of the Strasbourg organs which have consistently maintained that there are positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of the rights contained in Article 11.
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Not only everyone regardless of their status or background characteristics (ethnicity, place of origin, religion, disability, etc.) are entitled to effective enjoyment of these rights but the contracting states are ununder obligation to prevent and remedy any breach thereof. 173 
IV.H. Article 17 and the Court's Jurisprudence
In the words of Pierre-Henri Teitgen, the French jurist who was one of the driving forces behind the drafting of the Convention which truly reflected the general post World War II perception that at certain times, democracies need to defend themselves against the threat of totalitarianism. 174 Adoption of Article 17 of the Convention which is prohibition on abuse of rights and to prevent totalitarian and extremist groups from justifying their activities by relying on the Convention encapsulates this approach. 175 This is exactly what the Court had to do in the early days of its existence. At this stage, it is worth noting that the Court's case-law regarding anti-democratic actors since its establishment until recent decades was mainly limited to Fascists and Communists applicants. 176 It is clear that the main idea behind the first proposal for a Convention was to provide human rights guarantees of a very basic and fundamental nature as a reaction to the atrocities committed in the World War II and the subsequent outbreak of the Cold war. 177 
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He was of the opinion that the best way to oppose the rise of ananti-Semitism in Europe was "free critique" in which democracies, unlike dictatorships, can cope with the sharpest controversies." 184 In relation to applicability of Article 17, he noted that "on the other hand the requirements of Article 17 also reflect concern for the defense of democratic society and its institution." 185 In contrast, the Court has adopted a much more ambivalent attitude towards political movements on the left side of the political spectrum. 186 Although the Court after the end of the Cold War adopted a more tolerant and measured approach towards left-wing political movements.
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V. Conclusion
The concept of a 'democratic society' encompasses the entire framework of the Convention and serves as a criterion for the assessment of legality of state action. The Convention entails a broad protection of the substantive rights that are said to be easily identified. 188 As it has been observed, the Court has derived its concept of democracy from the components of the contemporary model of democracy in Europe from its origin, preamble and text of the Convention. Indeed the drafters of the European Convention on Human rights adopted the notion of liberal democracy and pluralism as the very corner stone of the Convention.
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In that regard, the Court considers liberal democracy as the only guarantee for fundamental freedom and human rights. The cases that this paper has analysed certainly reveal the Court's adherence to representative democracy and free elections as well as the importance of transparency and accountability in public and political spheres. Along with reference to a 'democratic society' in relation to the qualification of rights, the substantive contents of Articles 10, 11 of the Convention and Article 3, Protocol I, combined provide a 190 These are the rights to free expression, free assembly and association, and the right to free elections.
In recent decades, the Court has recognised Article 9 of the Convention as "one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention." However, the abovementioned rights are not absolute and are subject to limitations set out in the second part of these articles. The restrictions must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, for the protection public order, health morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Furthermore, through the doctrine of "margin of appreciation" allows the member states certain discretion to interfere with or limit human rights in specific instances. This "margin of appreciation", however, is increasingly subject to oversight by the Court in order to ensure objective compliance with the protected rights. This approach is increasingly adopted by the Court in cases concerning transitional democracies in former Communist totalitarian systems. This paper has shown that since the collapse of the Soviet Union and accession of all of the former European communist states to the Council of Europe the Court has faced a huge challenge in upholding and enforcing the values of democracy, since most of these states were new to the notion of liberal democracy. This led to the emergence of new kind of applicant bringing litigation against new states defending those cases.
This new challenge has prompted the court to reiterate and articulate a coherent normative conception of democracy even though that conception is bound to be contested. As a result, democracy in the context of the Convention cannot be understood merely in a formal sense as majority rule. Democracy must primarily be understood as participatory democracy, with respect for different opinion and belief, and focused on freedom of expression as a means of ensuring active involvement of the people in the decision-making processes.
